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Abstract
We introduce a stochastic learning process called the dampened gradient ap-
proximation process. While learning models have almost exclusively focused on
finite games, in this paper we design a learning process for games with continuous
action sets. It is payoff-based and thus requires from players no sophistication
and no knowledge of the game. We show that despite such limited information,
players will converge to Nash in large classes of games. In particular, convergence
to a Nash equilibrium which is stable is guaranteed in all games with strategic
complements as well as in concave games; convergence to Nash often occurs in all
locally ordinal potential games; convergence to a stable Nash occurs with positive
probability in all games with isolated equilibria.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we construct a simple stochastic learning rule with the three following
properties: (i) it is designed for games with continuous action sets; (ii) it requires no
sophistication from the players and (iii) it converges to Nash equilibria in large classes
of games. The question of convergence to Nash equilibria by agents playing a game
repeatedly has given rise to a large body of literature on learning. One branch of this
literature explores whether there are learning rules - deterministic or stochastic - which
would converge to Nash equilibria in any game (see i.e. Hart and Mas-Colell (2003),
Hart and Mas-Colell (2006), Babichenko (2012), Foster and Young (2006), Germano
and Lugosi (2007)). Another branch, to which this paper contributes, focuses on specific
learning rules and on the understanding of their asymptotic behavior.
Both branches have almost exclusively addressed the issue of learning in discrete
games (i.e. games where the set of strategies is finite). However, many economic
variables such as price, effort, time allocation, are non-negative real numbers, and
thus are continuous. Typical learning models that have been designed for discrete
games cannot be adapted to continuous settings without major complications, since they
usually rely on assigning a positive probability to choosing each action, which cannot
be done in continuous games. In this paper we introduce a learning rule designed for
continuous games, which we call the dampened gradient approximation process (DGAP),
and we analyze its behavior in several well-known classes of games.
Learning rules can be more or less demanding in terms of players’ sophistication
and of the amount of information required to implement them. The DGAP belongs to
the category of so-called payoff-based or completely uncoupled learning rules, meaning
that players know nothing about the payoff functions (neither theirs nor those of their
opponents), and they know nothing about the other players’ actions, nor about their
payoffs. They may not even be aware that they are playing a game. They only observe
their own realized payoffs after each iteration of the game and make decisions based on
these observations.
Agents aim at maximizing their payoffs by choosing an action. If players knew
the gradient of their utility function at every point, a natural learning process in
continuous games would be for agents to follow a gradient method (see for instance
Arrow and Hurwicz (1960)). However, because players neither know the payoff func-
tions nor observe the others’ actions, they would be unable to compute these gradients.
In DGAP, agents construct an approximation of the gradient at the current action
profile, by randomly exploring the effects of increasing or decreasing their actions by
small increments. The agents use the information collected from this exploration to
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choose a new action: if the effect revealed is an increase (resp. decrease) in payoff, then
players move in the same (resp. opposite) direction, with an amplitude proportional to
the approximated gradient.
Although this procedure resembles a gradient learning process, there are two major
differences from a standard gradient method. First, the DGAP is a random process
instead of a deterministic dynamical system. Second, in the standard gradient method
with non-negative actions, players’ behaviors are discontinuous at the boundary of the
strategy space (see Arrow and Hurwicz (1960)). In order to avoid such discontinuity in
players’ behavior, we assume that changes in actions are dampened as they approach
the boundary. Hence the name of our learning process.
We first prove that this process is well-defined - i.e. players’ actions always remain
non-negative (Proposition 1). Then we analyze its convergence properties and find that
contrary to discrete games, where convergence to Nash of specific learning processes is
generally difficult to obtain even for two- or three-player games, convergence is obtained
in large classes of games with arbitrary numbers of players. We restrict to strongly
single-peaked payoff functions1, focusing our attention on three classes of games that are
of particular interest for economics and have been extensively analyzed in the learning
literature: games with strategic complements, a class of games containing all potential
games, and all games where the set of Nash equilibria is finite. This last class includes
all games with a unique Nash equilibrium, such as strictly concave games and many of
the generalized continuous zero-sum games.
The DGAP is a stochastic process, the random part being the direction chosen for
the exploration. We analyze its (random) set of accumulation points, called the limit set,
by resorting to stochastic approximation theory. This theory tells us that the long-run
behavior of the stochastic process is driven by some underlying deterministic dynamical
system. We thus start by showing that the deterministic system that underlies our
specific stochastic learning process is a dampened gradient system (Proposition 1).
We also show that all the Nash equilibria of a game are stationary points - otherwise
called zeros - of this dynamical system, although other points may also be stationary.
However, we prove (Proposition 2) that non-Nash stationary points are necessarily
unstable2. This is done in Section 2, where we also detail the DGAP and provide the
necessary definitions.
Stochastic approximation theory tells us that the stationary points of the underlying
dynamical system are plausible candidates for the limit set of the random process. Yet
it does not provide general criteria for excluding some of these candidates so as to
1See Hypothesis 1 for a proper definition.
2Throughout the paper, several notions of stability will be used. They are all recalled in Section 2.
3
obtain more precise predictions. This is actually one of the major difficulties in the
field (see for instance (2012)). While the conceptual contribution of this paper lies
in providing a natural learning process for games with continuous action sets, our
technical contribution lies in providing precise statements on the structure of the limit
set of the DGAP. Each result that we get is different, in the sense that it uses a different
mathematical tool. It is remarkable that almost all our results hold with probability
one, which is in general very difficult to obtain.
In Section 3, we analyze games with strategic complements. We show (Theorem
1) that the DGAP cannot converge3 to an unstable Nash equilibrium. Furthermore,
we prove that the process will almost surely converge to a Nash equilibrium which
is stable, except in very specific cases involving the structure of interactions between
players: non-convergence might occur under a condition called bipartiteness.
In Section 4, we analyze a class of games that we call locally ordinal potential games.
This class contains all the ordinal potential games, which in turn contain all the po-
tential games. We have three results (in Theorems 2 and 3). First, the limit set of
the DGAP is always contained in the set of stationary points of the dynamics. When
equilibria are isolated, this implies that the process converges to a Nash equilibrium
with probability one, since we prove that the process cannot converge to a non-Nash
stationary point in these games. Second, we show that under the condition of non-
bipartiteness, the DGAP converges to a Nash equilibrium which is stable when equi-
libria are isolated. Third, although convergence to unstable stationary points (possibly
non-Nash) cannot be ruled out in general (i.e. when equilibria are not isolated), we
characterize the set of stable stationary points. We prove that they are local maxima of
the locally ordinal potential function, that they are necessarily connected components
of Nash equilibria, and that they are necessarily stable equilibria of another, unrelated
dynamical system: the Best-Response dynamics.
Finally, in Section 5, we consider all games for which stationary points are isolated.
This class includes the vast majority of games studied in economics. We cannot prove
precise and general convergence results, since there is no guarantee that the limit set of
the process will be included in the set of stationary points. Still, we state two results.
First, DGAP will converge to a stable Nash equilibrium with positive probability in all
these games. Second, we exclude convergence to what we call undesirable stationary
points, i.e. those that are non-Nash, and unstable Nash equilibria.
Also in Section 5, we focus on games with a unique Nash equilibrium that have
3Because the process is stochastic, the notion of convergence we use here is that of almost sure
convergence.
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previously been analyzed, either by Arrow and Hurwicz (1960) or by Rosen (1965).
They examined dynamical systems which are either discontinuous or complex gradient
systems, obtaining convergence to the unique Nash equilibrium. We obtain the same
results - for our process - with convergence to the unique equilibrium with probability
one. Thus, another contribution of this paper is to show that we can use a gradient
system which is both simple and continuous, and preserve the convergence properties.
Related Literature
As mentioned earlier, the learning literature has essentially focused on finite action
games. Many rules have been proposed and studied, both in the non payoff-based and
in the payoff-based contexts. In the former, the most widely-explored adaptive pro-
cess is fictitious play (introduced in Brown (1951)), where players’ average actions are
shown to converge4 for 2-player zero-sum games (Robinson (1951)), for 2 × N games
(Miyazawa (1961) and Berger (2005)), for potential games (Monderer and Shapley
(1996)). Convergence is also obtained for stochastic fictitious play, introduced by
Fudenberg and Kreps (1993), in 2×2 games (Bena¨ım and Hirsch (1999)), zero-sum and
potential games (Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002)) and supermodular games (Bena¨ım
and Faure (2012)). However, it has been shown that fictitious play does not always
converge to Nash once there are at least 3 actions per player (Shapley (1964)). Other
non payoff-based learning rules include hypothesis testing (Foster and Young (2003))
or calibrated forecasting (Kakade and Foster (2008)). Our contribution differs in both
dimensions: we focus on continuous games and on payoff-based procedures.
Many payoff-based learning rules have been explored in the context of discrete
games. Such rules include the popular class of reinforcement learning procedures (see
Bo¨rgers and Sarin (1997) or Erev and Roth (1998) for pioneer work). These procedures
have been studied in very specific finite games: 2 × 2 games in Posch (1997), 2-player
games with positive payoffs in Bo¨rgers and Sarin (1997), Beggs (2005), Hopkins and Posch
(2005) or Laslier et al. (2001). On the same topic, see also Leslie and Collins (2005),
Cominetti et al. (2010), Bravo and Faure (2015) and Bravo (2016). However, it is not
known if these procedures converge to Nash in more general games.
Other payoff-based procedures for discrete games have been proposed, including:
Regret-testing (Foster and Young (2006)) which converges in any 2-person game; Gen-
eralized regret-testing ( (2007)) which converges in any generic n-person game; Ex-
perimentation dynamics (Marden et al. (2009)) which converge to Nash in the class of
n-person weakly acyclic games; Trial and error (Young (2009)) which comes close to
4In all of the following papers, the convergence notions differ. This has implications in terms of the
scope of each result. For details the reader should refer directly to the papers.
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Nash equilibrium a large fraction of the time; Aspirational learning (Karandikar et al.
(1998)) which may fail to converge even in 2× 2 games.
The literature on continuous game is sparser, and a distinction can also be made
between procedures which are demanding in terms of sophistication and knowledge of
the players, and procedures which are of the payoff-based type. In the first category,
Arrow and Hurwicz (1960) prove that when all players’ payoff functions are strictly
concave, the gradient method converges to the unique Nash equilibrium in generalized
zero-sum games. Rosen (1965) studies a gradient method in concave n-person games
with a unique equilibrium, and shows that this unique equilibrium is globally asymp-
totically stable for some weighted gradient system, with suitably chosen weights. In
a recent paper, Mertikopoulos (2018) studies a gradient-like stochastic learning algo-
rithm where agents receive erroneous information about their gradients in the context
of concave games, and shows that whenever this process converges, it does so to a Nash
equilibrium. Using a different approach, Perkins and Leslie (2014) adapt stochastic
fictitious play to games with continuous action sets, and show that it converges in 2-
player zero-sum games. Our contribution differs from these in analyzing a payoff-based
learning process.
The two papers most closely related to ours are those analyzing payoff-based proce-
dures designed for continuous games. Dindos and Mezzetti (2006) consider a stochastic
adjustment process called the better-reply. At each step, agents are sequentially picked
to play a strategy chosen at random, while the other players do not move. The agent
then observes the hypothetical payoff that this action would yield, and decides whether
to stick to this new strategy or to go back to the previous one. This process converges
to Nash when actions are either substitutes or complements around the equilibrium in
games called aggregative games, with quasi-concave utility functions. However, their
contribution differs from ours in several respects, the most important being that agents
revise their strategies sequentially. The driving force for convergence is that with pos-
itive probability, every player will be randomly drawn as many times as necessary to
approximate a best response. In our paper, we assume that all players move simulta-
neously. In that case, it is easy to construct a simple game where simultaneity drives
the better-reply adjustment process to cycle.
The second related paper, by Huck et al. (2004), considers another type of payoff-
based learning process, called Trial and error - but which has no link with the Young
(2009) procedure - in the context of the Cournot oligopoly, where players move simulta-
neously, as in our paper. Players choose a direction of change and stick to this direction
as long as their payoff increases, changing as soon as it decreases. The authors show
that the process converges, but it does so to the joint-profit maximizing profile and not
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to the (unique) Nash equilibrium of the game. While our paper is similar to theirs in
spirit, unlike them, we do not focus on a specific game5, we allow for multiple equilibria,
including continua of equilibria, and we get convergence to Nash. Our process differs
in two respects. First, we consider an exploration stage where the players decide in
which direction they will be moving. This exploration stage seems to make our agents
less naive. Second, the amplitude of the moves is constant in their paper while in ours,
amplitude depends on the variation in payoffs after an exploration stage. This might
explain why we obtain convergence to Nash while they do not.
A group of papers coming from a different literature deserves mention here: in the
literature on evolutionary dynamics in population games, many dynamical systems have
been suggested in the context of infinite populations choosing strategies among a finite
set. Recently, several papers have extended these dynamical systems to continuous
strategy spaces. The continuous strategy version of the replicator dynamic has been
studied by Bomze (1990), Oechssler and Riedel (2001), Oechssler and Riedel (2002),
and Cressman (2005), while the Brown-von Neumann-Nash (BNN) dynamic has been
extended by Hofbauer et al. (2009). Lahkar and Riedel (2015) extend the logit dynam-
ics, Cheung (2014) adapts the pairwise comparison dynamics and Cheung (2016) works
with the class of imitative dynamics (which includes the replicator dynamics). Although
this group of papers deals with dynamical systems for continuous games, their contexts
are totally different (continuum of players). Moreover, their main goal is to define the
extensions of existing dynamics, and to see whether they are well-defined and share the
same properties as their discrete-strategy counterparts.
2 The model
2.1 Definitions and hypothesis
Let N = {1, . . . , N} be a set of players, each of whom repeatedly chooses an action
from Xi = [0,+∞[. An action xi ∈ Xi can be thought of as an effort level chosen by
individuals, a price set by a firm, a monetary contribution to a public good, etc. Let
X = ×i=1,...,NXi. We denote by ∂X the boundary of X , i.e. ∂X := {x ∈ X ; xi =
0 for some i ∈ N}. And we let Int(X) := X \ ∂X denote the interior of X .
At each period of time, players observe a payoff that is generated by an underlying
repeated game G = (N , X, u), where u = (ui)i=1,...,N is the vector of payoff functions.
Players know nothing about the payoff functions, nor about the set of opponents. In
5Although, as the authors suggest, the intuition for their result might carry through to other games.
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this paper we will examine several classes of underlying games, each class being defined
by different properties on the functions ui. However, we will always make the two
following standing assumptions:
Hypothesis 1 For any i, the payoff map ui is assumed to be C1 on RN+ and with the
property that, for any x−i ∈ X−i, there exists M(x−i) ∈ Xi such that the map xi 7→
∂ui
∂xi
(xi, x−i) is strictly positive for xi < M(x−i) and strictly negative for xi > M(x−i).
Hypothesis 1 implies that best responses are unique and BRi(x−i) = M(x−i). This
assumption is verified for instance if xi 7→ ui(xi, x−i) is strictly concave,
∂ui
∂xi
(0, x−i) > 0
and limxi→+∞
∂ui
∂xi
(xi, x−i) < 0.
In the games we consider, interactions between players can be very general. They
can be heterogeneous across players and they can be of any sign. However we assume
that externalities are symmetric in sign:
Hypothesis 2 Games are assumed to have symmetric externalities, i.e. ∀i 6= j and
∀x,
sgn
(
∂ui
∂xj
(x)
)
= sgn
(
∂uj
∂xi
(x)
)
where sgn(a) = 0 if a = 0.
Most of the continuous games in the economics literature fall into this class. Note
that a game with symmetric externalities does not require them to be of equal intensity.
Also, symmetric externalities allow for patterns where i exerts a positive externality on
individual j and a negative externality on individual k. Note finally that symmetric
externalities do not imply that sgn
(
∂ui
∂xj
(x)
)
= sgn
(
∂ui
∂xj
(x′)
)
for x 6= x′.
Some of our results will depend on the pattern of interactions in the game G. We
capture this pattern by an interaction graph, defined as follows. Let x = (x1, . . . , xN)
be an action profile. The interaction graph at profile x is given by the matrix G(x)
where gii(x) = 0 and, for i 6= j, gij(x) = 1 if
∂ui
∂xj
(x) 6= 0 and gij(x) = 0 otherwise. Note
that the interaction graph is local, in the sense that it depends on the vector of actions.
Thus G(x) can either be constant on X or change as x changes. Note also that the
interaction graph of a game satisfying Hypothesis 2 is symmetric.
We now provide two examples of games satisfying Hypothesis 1 and 2 and describe
the interaction graphs.
Example 1 (Public good game) Players contribute an effort x ∈ [0; +∞[ to a pub-
lic good. The payoff of player i is ui(x) = bi(xi +
∑
j 6=i δijxj) − ci.xi, where ci > 0
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is the marginal cost of effort for i, 1 ≥ δij ≥ 0 is a measure of subtitutability be-
tween i and j’s efforts, and bi(.) is a differentiable, strictly increasing concave func-
tion. In some contexts, not all players will benefit from one player’s contribution (see
Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007)). This is why we leave the possibility that δij = 0 for
some pairs (i, j).
This game satisfies Hypothesis 1 and 2. Further, the interaction graph is constant
since it does not depend on the action profile x: gij(x) = 0 if δij = 0, while gij(x) =
1 if δij > 0.
Example 2 (Aggregate demand externalities) In macro-economics, aggregate-
demand-externality models (see for instance Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)) are games
satisfying Hypothesis 1 and 2. For instance, search models a` la Diamond enter this class,
where players exert a search effort xi, with payoff functions ui(x) = αxi
∑
j 6=i xj−c(xi),
and where c(xi) is the cost of searching, xixj is the probability that i and j end up
partners and α is the gain when a partner is found. The interaction graph of such a
game depends on the profile x, since ∂ui
∂xj
(x) = αxi, thus gij(x) = 0 if xi = 0, while
gij(x) = 1 if xi 6= 0.
This game can be generalized to local search models with payoffs ui(x) = αxi
∑
j 6=i δijxj−
c(xi), where, as above, δij ≥ 0 and where δij = 0 means that individual j exerts no
externality on individual i. A popular game analyzed in the network literature in a dif-
ferent context is the game introduced in Ballester et al. (2006), which is actually a local
aggregate-demand-externality model, where c(xi) =
1
2
x2i − xi, and δij ∈ {0, 1}. In that
case, the interaction graph only partly depends on x, since δij = 0 implies gij(x) = 0
for all x.
We denote by NE the set of Nash equilibria. In many economics applications, Nash
equilibria would consist of isolated points. Examples 1 and 2 provide examples of games
where the set of Nash equilibria is generically finite. However, in what follows we will
sometimes deal with a continuum of equilibria. This is the case for instance in Example
1, when δij ∈ {0, 1} (see Bervoets and Faure (2018)). Because we wish to be as general
as possible, we will consider connected components of NE:
Definition 1 Let Λ be a compact connected subset of NE and let N δ(Λ) := {y ∈ X :
d(y,Λ) < δ}. We say that Λ is a connected component of NE if there exists δ > 0
such that N δ(Λ) ∩NE = Λ.
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2.2 The Learning Process
We consider a payoff-based learning process in which agents construct a partial approx-
imation of the gradient by exploring the effects of deviating in one direction that they
chose at random at every period. This information allows agents to choose a new action
depending on what they just learned from the exploration stage. Here we detail what
agent i does, bearing in mind that every agent simultaneously uses the same rule.
• At the beginning of round n, agent i is playing action xin := e
i
2n and is enjoying the
associated payoff ui(e
i
2n, e
−i
2n). Player i then selects his actions e
i
2n+1 and e
i
2n+2(= x
i
n+1)
as follows.
• Exploration stage - Player i plays a new action ei2n+1, chosen at random around
his current action ei2n. Formally, let (ǫ
i
n)n be a sequence of i.i.d random variables such
that P(ǫin = 1) = P(ǫ
i
n = −1) = 1/2. At period n, ǫ
i
n is drawn and player i plays
ei2n+1 := e
i
2n +
1
n+1
ǫin.
• Updating stage - Player i observes his new payoff, and computes
∆uin+1 := ui(e
i
2n+1, e
−i
2n+1)− ui(e
i
2n, e
−i
2n).
This quantity provides i with an approximation of his payoff function’s gradient. Using
this information, player i updates his action by playing ei2n+2 := e
i
2n + ǫ
i
n∆u
i
n+1e
i
2n.
Thus, when ∆uin+1 is positive, player i follows the direction that he just explored, while
he goes in the opposite direction when ∆uin+1 is negative.
• Period n ends. We set xin+1 := e
i
2n+2 and agent i gets the payoff ui(e
i
2n+2, e
−i
2n+2).
Round n + 1 starts.
Let xn = e2n and Fn be the history generated by {e1, ..., e2n+1}. Studying the
asymptotic behavior of the random sequence (en)n amounts to studying the sequence
(xn)n. Hence the focus of this paper is on the convergence of the random process (xn)n.
The next proposition shows that the process is well-defined, in the sense that it
always remains within the admissible region (i.e. the actions stay positive). It also
proves that the DGAP is a discrete time stochastic approximation process.
Proposition 1 The iterative process is such that xin > 0 for all i.
It can be written as
xn+1 = xn +
1
n + 1
(F (xn) + Un+1 + ξn+1) , (1)
where
(i) F (x) = (Fi(x))i with Fi(x) = xi
∂ui
∂xi
(xi, x−i),
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(ii) Un+1 is a bounded martingale difference (i.e E (Un+1 | Fn) = 0),
(iii) ξn = O(1/n).
All our proofs are in the appendix.
The iterative process (1) is a discrete time stochastic process with step 1
n+1
.6. If
there were no stochastic term, the process (1) would write
xn+1 = xn +
1
n+ 1
F (xn),
which corresponds to the well-known Euler method, a numerical procedure for approx-
imating the solutions of the deterministic ordinary differential equation (ODE)
x˙ = F (x). (2)
Although the (stochastic) process (1) differs from the (deterministic) process (2)
because of the random noise, the asymptotic behavior of (2) will inform us on the
asymptotic behavior of (1).7
Remark 1 In the standard gradient method (see for instance Arrow and Hurwicz (1960)),
the dynamical system is defined as x˙ = H(x) where
Hi(x) =
{
∂ui
∂xi
(x) unless xi = 0 and
∂ui
∂xi
(x) < 0,
0 otherwise.
(3)
The function H is thus discontinuous, since the process could otherwise leave the ad-
missible space. Conversely, the dynamical system underlying the DGAP is continuous:
Fi(x) = xi
∂ui
∂xi
(x). The role played by the multiplicative factor xi is to dampen the vari-
ations of the state variable and ensure that it will never reach the boundary - although
it can converge to it. This is not unreasonable behavior: the gradient system assumes
6Note that
∑
n
1
n+1
=∞ and limn→∞
1
n+1
= 0. It is important that the sum diverges, to guarantee
that the process does not get ”stuck” anywhere, unless agents want to stay where they are. Further, it
is important that the terms go to zero, so that the process can ”settle” when agents want to. In fact, the
term 1
n+1
can be replaced by any step of the form αn+1, where
∑
n
αn+1 =∞ and limn→∞ αn+1 = 0,
without affecting the results.
7Stochastic approximation theory (see Bena¨ım (1996) or Bena¨ım (1999) for instance) tells us that,
as periods unfold, the random process gets arbitrarily close to the solution curve of its underlying
dynamical system. In other words, given a time horizon T > 0 - however large it might be - the
process shadows the trajectory of some solution curve between times t and t + T with arbitrary
accuracy, provided t is large enough.
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that players crash onto the boundary, whereas we assume that the closer they get to the
boundary, the smaller their movements become.
In Rosen (1965), the author studies another gradient method also ensuring that the
system never leaves the state space. The system is given by
Hi(x) = ri
∂ui
∂xi
(x) +
k∑
j=1
λj
∂hj
∂xi
(x), (4)
where the hj functions are the constraints defining the convex and compact set R where x
lives (i.e. R = {x; h(x) ≥ 0}), ri and λj are appropriately chosen weights guaranteeing
that the system will always remain within the set R.
2.3 Limit sets
The focus of this paper is on the asymptotic behavior of the random process (xn)n.
Hence we are interested in its limit set8.
Definition 2 (Limit set of (xn)n) Given a realization of the random process, we de-
note the limit set of (xn)n by
L ((xn)n) := {x ∈ X ; ∃ a subsequence xnk such that; xnk → x}. (5)
Note that the limit set of the learning process is a random object, because the
asymptotic behavior of the sequence (xn)n depends on the realization of the random
sequence (ǫn)n, drawn at every exploration stage.
Proposition 1 allows us to make use of stochastic approximation theory, which pro-
vides a characterization of the candidates for L ((xn)n)9. In particular the ω-limit sets
of x˙ = F (x)10 lie among these candidates. However, several difficulties remain: first,
8In the remainder of the paper, we will always place ourselves on the event {lim supn ‖xn‖ < +∞},
i.e. we will abstract from the possible realizations which take the process to infinity.
9In Bena¨ım (1999), it is established that on {lim supn ‖xn‖ < +∞}, the limit set of (xn) is always
compact, invariant and attractor-free. This class of sets is called internally chain transitive (ICT).
These sets can take very complicated forms, but they conveniently include the zeroes of F and the
ω-limit set of any point x (if non-empty).
10Let ϕ(x, t) denote the flow of F (.), i.e. the position of the solution of (2) with initial condition x, at
time t. Then, the ω-limit set of x is given by ω(x) := {z ∈ X ; limk→∞ϕ(x, tk) = z for some tk →∞}.
Notice that by the regularity assumption on u(.), F satisfies the Cauchy-Lipschitz condition that
guarantees that, for all x ∈ X , ϕ is well-defined and unique. We consider the restriction of ϕ on
X(= RN+ ), since X = R
N
+ is invariant for its flow, and our random process (1) always remains in the
positive orthant.
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there might be other candidates that are not ω-limit sets of the underlying ODE. More-
over, this theory does not provide general criteria to systematically exclude any of these
candidates, nor to confirm that they are indeed equal to L ((xn)n).
The stationary points of the dynamical system (2) are particular ω-limit sets that
will be of interest to us, as they contain all the Nash equilibria of the underlying
game. The set of stationary points, denoted Z(F ), will be called the zeros of F :
Z(F ) := {x ∈ X ;F (x) = 0}. For convenience, we drop the reference to F and simply
write Z.
Observe that Fi(x) = xi
∂ui
∂xi
(x). Thus, x ∈ Z ⇐⇒ ∀i ∈ N ,
(
xi = 0 or
∂ui
∂xi
(xi, x−i) = 0
)
,
while x ∈ NE ⇐⇒ ∀i ∈ N ,
(
∂ui
∂xi
(xi, x−i) = 0, or xi = 0 and
∂ui
∂xi
(xi, x−i) ≤ 0
)
. This
implies that all the Nash equilibria of the game are included in the set of zeros of F .
Unfortunately, Z contains more than the set of Nash equilibria. We call x ∈ Z \ NE
an other zero (OZ) of the dynamical system:
OZ =
{
x : F (x) = 0 and ∃i s.t. xi = 0,
∂ui
∂xi
(x) > 0
}
.
We have the following partition of F:
Z = NE ∪ OZ. (6)
Note that ∂X might contain some points in NE, however OZ ⊂ ∂X .
Convergence or non-convergence of our random process to a given point or set
will sometimes depend on the stability of the latter with respect to the deterministic
dynamical system x˙ = F (x). In different sections we use various notions of stability,
which we recall here.
Let xˆ ∈ Z. The point xˆ is asymptotically stable (denoted by xˆ ∈ ZAS) if it uniformly
attracts an open neighborhood W of itself: limt→+∞ supx∈W ‖ϕ(x, t) − xˆ‖ = 0, where
ϕ(x, t) denotes the flow of F (·). The point xˆ is linearly stable (denoted by xˆ ∈ ZLS)
if for any λ ∈ Sp(DF (xˆ)) - where DF (xˆ) is the Jacobian matrix of F evaluated at xˆ
and Sp(M) is the spectrum of matrix M - we have Re(λ) < 0 and xˆ is linearly unstable
(denoted by xˆ ∈ ZLU) if there exists λ ∈ Sp(DF (xˆ)) such that Re(λ) > 0. Note that
if xˆ is hyperbolic (that is Re(λ) 6= 0 for any λ ∈ Sp(DF (xˆ))) then it is either linearly
stable or linearly unstable. We denote the set Z \ ZLU by ZS and by a slight abuse of
language, we will call all points in ZS stable.
We have the following inclusions:
ZLS ⊂ ZAS ⊂ ZS.
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Proposition 2 We have OZ ⊂ ZLU . As a consequence, ZS ⊂ NE.
To prove this, we take x in OZ and pick an individual such that xi = 0 and
∂ui
∂xi
> 0.
We then show that ∂ui
∂xi
is an eigenvalue ofDF (x). The direct consequence of Proposition
2 is that if the limit set L ((xn)n) contains stable stationary points, they must be stable
Nash equilibria.
In view of Proposition 2, we will use the following notations in the remainder:
NELS := ZLS, NEAS := ZAS and NES := ZS.
As mentioned earlier, we will sometimes be dealing with connected components of
NE instead of isolated points. We will thus use the concept of attractor (see Ruelle
(1981)):
Definition 3 Let S ⊂ X be invariant for the flow ϕ. Then a set A ⊂ S is an attractor
for x˙ = F (x) if
(i) A is compact and invariant;
(ii) there exists an open neighborhood U of A with the following property:
∀ǫ > 0, ∃T > 0 such that ∀x ∈ U, ∀ t ≥ T, d(ϕ(x, t), A) < ǫ.
An attractor for a dynamical system is a set with strong properties: it uniformly attracts
a neighborhood of itself.
Remark 2 Let xˆ ∈ Z be an isolated stationary point of x˙ = F (x). Then xˆ is asymp-
totically stable if and only if {xˆ} is an attractor for x˙ = F (x).
We turn to the analysis of several classes of games.
3 Strategic complements
Definition 4 A game G is a game with strategic complements if payoff functions are
such that ∂
2ui
∂xi∂xj
(x) ≥ 0 for all i 6= j.
Games with strategic complements have nice structured sets of Nash equilibria
(Vives (1990)), and offer nice convergence properties for specific dynamical systems.
However, it can be difficult to obtain convergence to Nash for general learning proce-
dures. There are several reasons for this that we illustrate here through two examples.
First, consider the Best-Response dynamics. Under Hypothesis 1, best-response
functions are differentiable and strictly increasing. In that case, Vives (1990) proves
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in Theorem 5.1 and Remark 5.2 that, except for a specific set of initial conditions,
the Best-Response dynamics, whether in discrete or in continuous time, monotonically
converges to an equilibrium point. Unfortunately, in our case this set of problematic
initial conditions cannot be excluded, in particular because the process is stochastic. It
could be that the stochastic process often passes through these points, in which case it
is known to possibly converge to very complicated sets11. In order to study convergence
of the DGAP, we thus need to consider all possible trajectories and cannot rely on
existing results.
Second, consider the standard reinforcement learning stochastic process, whose
mean dynamics are the replicator dynamics. As shown in Posch (1997), the process
can converge with positive probability to stationary points that are not only unsta-
ble, but also non-Nash. Examples can be constructed with 2 players, each having 2
strategies, supermodular payoff matrices with a unique strict Nash equilibrium, which
is, moreover, found by elimination of dominated strategies. Yet even then, the learn-
ing process converges with positive probability to any other combination of strategies.
This happens because there are some stationary points of the dynamics where the noise
generated by the random process is null.
These two examples illustrate how, despite the games’ appealing properties, conver-
gence to Nash is neither guaranteed nor easy to show when it occurs. We show that the
DGAP will converge. In order to get our result, we first need to prove that no point in
∂X , the boundary of the state space, will be included in the limit set of the process.
We start by imposing a simple and natural hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 For any agent i,
∂ui
∂xi
(0, 0) > 0.
Hypothesis 3 guarantees that players want to move away from the origin. Because of
strategic complementarities, this also implies that players want to move away from any
point of ∂X (since ∂ui
∂xi
(0, x−i) >
∂ui
∂xi
(0, 0)). However, despite the fact that all players
prefer to move away from the boundary, it is not clear why the stochastic process should
remain at a distance from this boundary. The difficulty comes from the following fact:
assume players start close to the boundary. Then, at the exploration stage, some
decrease their efforts while others increase theirs. Although complementarities imply
that the players who decreased their efforts would have been better-off if they had
instead increased them, they could still end up with a better payoff than before the
exploration, and thus continue decreasing at the updating stage, getting closer to ∂X .
11See Hirsch (1999).
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The following proposition proves that this will not happen in the long run.
Proposition 3 Under Hypothesis 3, there exists a > 0 such that L((xn)n) ⊂ [a,+∞[N
almost surely.
From the mathematical point of view, the major problem to obtain Proposition 3 is
to show that a stochastic approximation algorithm like the one given by (1) is pushed
away from an invariant set for F where the noise term vanishes. In fact, there is almost
no general result along these lines in the literature.
The proof of Proposition 3 is long and technical, but the idea goes as follows: among
the players close to the boundary, the player exerting the least effort will increase his
effort on average. Unfortunately, this does not imply that the smallest effort also
increases, since another player may have decreased his. We thus construct a stochastic
process which is a suitable approximation of the smallest effort over time. We then
show that this new process cannot get close to the boundary, and because it is close
asymptotically to our process, we are able to conclude.
Definition 5 The interaction graph G(x) is said to be bipartite at x ∈ X if the set N
of players can be partitioned into N1 and N2 such that for any pair of players i and j
we have
gij(x) = 1 =⇒ (i ∈ N1 and j ∈ N2) or (i ∈ N2 and j ∈ N1) .
An interaction graph is non-bipartite on a set A if for all x ∈ A, G(x) is not
bipartite.
We are now ready to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 1 Consider a game of strategic complements and smooth payoff functions,
and assume that Hypothesis 3 holds. Then
(i) The learning process (xn) cannot converge to an unstable Nash equilibrium:
∀ x˜ ∈ NELU , P
(
lim
n
xn = x˜
)
= 0.
(ii) If, in addition, the interaction graph is non-bipartite on Int(X), the learning
process (xn) almost surely converges to a stable Nash equilibrium:
P
(
∃ x∗ ∈ NES : lim
n
xn = x
∗
)
= 1.
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This result is very tight. Because the hypotheses of the theorem are verified for most
common economic models we can think of, this theorem guarantees that the learning
process will not only converge to Nash in most cases, it will additionally converge
to a stable equilibrium. In cases where the interaction graph is bipartite, we cannot
guarantee that the process will not converge to general unstable sets12. However, we
can still exclude convergence to linearly unstable equilibria by point (i).
Let us provide some insights on the bipartiteness condition. As in Posch (1997), one
potential issue is that the random process could get stuck around stationary points of
the underlying dynamics if the random noise is zero at these stationary points. More
precisely, a stationary point is unstable if there is some direction along which the system
”escapes” the stationary point. But the system has to be able to follow that direction,
otherwise it will get stuck. The random process plays precisely this role here: it allows
the system to escape, as long as the unstable direction component of the random noise
(Un)n is not zero at that point. At an unstable equilibrium, we can show that the noise
is not zero in the unstable direction and this guarantees the non-convergence result
of part (i). The non-bipartiteness of the network guarantees that the noise (Un)n has
the property of being uniformly exciting everywhere in Int(X), which guarantees that
the process can escape in any direction. This yields part (ii). When the network is
bipartite, this property does not hold and we cannot guarantee that the process will
not get stuck in an unstable set.
Note that the bipartiteness condition does not imply that the process will not con-
verge to an element of ZS. However, we provide two examples in the appendix (Exam-
ples E.1 and E.2) in which we show that the noise can vanish on bipartite networks in
games that have either no strategic complements or no symmetric externalities. In our
examples the noise vanishes at unstable equilibria.
4 Locally ordinal potential games
We introduce a class of games that we call the locally ordinal potential games. Recall
that a game G is a potential game (PG) if there is a function P : X → R such that for all
x−i ∈ X−i, for all xi, x′i ∈ Xi, we have ui(xi, x−i)−ui(x
′
i, x−i) = P (xi, x−i)−P (x
′
i, x−i),
and an ordinal potential game (OPG) if ui(xi, x−i)− ui(x′i, x−i) > 0 ⇐⇒ P (xi, x−i)−
P (x′i, x−i) > 0.
Definition 6 A game G is a locally ordinal potential game (LOPG) if there is a dif-
12Linearly unstable equilibria are unstable sets, but unstable sets also include much more complex
structures.
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ferentiable function P : X → R such that
sgn
(
∂ui
∂xi
(x)
)
= sgn
(
∂P
∂xi
(x)
)
The class of LOPG is large, in the sense that PG ⊂ OPG ⊂ LOPG when P is
differentiable. It also contains many games of economic interest. For instance, both
examples 1 and 2 are locally ordinal potential games.
The generality of our results depends on the structure of the set of stationary points
of the game under consideration, and in particular on whether it consists of isolated
points or not. For instance, the public good game of example 1 generically has a finite
number of isolated zeros, but can have continua of equilibria for certain values of the
substitutability parameter13.
Theorem 2 Let G be an LOPG and P be sufficiently regular. Then
(i) P (L(xn)n ⊂ Z) = 1.
(ii) If G has isolated zeros, then
P
(
∃ x∗ ∈ NE : lim
n
xn = x
∗
)
= 1.
If, in addition, the interaction graph is non-bipartite on NE, then
P
(
∃ x∗ ∈ NES : lim
n
xn = x
∗
)
= 1.
For any LOPG, the only set to which the stochastic learning process can converge
is the set of zeros of F . Complex ω-limit sets of the dynamical system, which are
non-zeros, can be discarded. We cannot, however, be sure that the process will not
reach a set containing other zeros, thus we cannot guarantee convergence to the set
of Nash equilibria. When zeros are isolated, however, convergence to Nash is proved
by the conjunction of the first point and the fact that the process cannot converge to
an isolated other zero. Furthermore, we prove that the DGAP cannot converge to a
linearly unstable Nash xˆ if G(xˆ) is non-bipartite (on this, we provide more details in
Section 5).
When zeros are non-isolated, we cannot guarantee that the DGAP will converge to
a stable set. We can use Bena¨ım (1999) to show that P (L(xn)n ⊂ A) > 0 on the event
{x0 ∈ B(A)}, for any attractor A of the ODE (2), where B(A) is the basin of attraction
of A. Combining this observation with point (i) of Theorem 2, we get the following
13See Bervoets and Faure (2018) for more details.
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important implication: if a connected set Λ is an attractor for x˙ = F (x), then Λ is a
connected component of Z.
However, when focusing on LOPGs, more can be said, since we are able to relate at-
tractors of the dynamics to the potential function P , and to another dynamical system,
extensively used in economics: Best-Response Dynamics (BRD).
Definition 7 Let BR : X → X, x 7→ BR(x) := (BR1(x−1), ...,BRn(x−n)). The
continuous-time Best-Response dynamics (thereafter, BRD) is defined as:
x˙ = −x+ BR(x) (7)
Definition 8 Let P be a smooth map and Λ be a connected component of Z, we say
that Λ is a local maximum of P if
(i) P is constant on Λ: P (x) = v, ∀x ∈ Λ;
(ii) there exists an open neighborhood U of Λ such that P (y) ≤ v ∀y ∈ U
We then have
Theorem 3 Assume G is an LOPG and let Λ be a connected set. Then the following
statements are equivalent
(i) Λ is an attractor for x˙ = F (x)
(ii) Λ is a local maximum of P
(iii) Λ ⊂ NE and Λ is an attractor for the best-response dynamics x˙ = −x+ BR(x).
This result is positive and informative. First, it tells us that attractors are necessar-
ily included in the set of Nash equilibria. Thus, although the process might converge
to other zeros when stationary points are non-isolated, these points are unstable.
Second, Theorem 3 provides two methods of finding the attractors: one way is to look
for local maxima of the potential function, which is very convenient when the function P
is known; and the other is to look for attractors for another dynamics, possibly simpler
to analyze, the BRD. Note that this second method establishes a relation between
two dynamics that are conceptually unrelated. Indeed, the BRD assumes that agents
are very sophisticated, as they know their exact payoff function, they observe their
opponents’ play and perform potentially complex computations. Solution curves may
be very different, but surprisingly, both dynamics share the same set of attractors.
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5 Isolated zeros
In the two previous sections we did not assume any specific structure on the set of zeros
of the dynamical system. However, in most economics games with continuous action
spaces, the set of zeros, and in particular the set of Nash equilibria, would be finite. In
that case, zeros are isolated points. For instance, in the public good game of example 1,
Bramoulle´ et al. (2014) show that the game has a finite number of equilibria for almost
every value of substitutability between efforts. The same can be said about the games
in example 2. In this section, we restrict our attention to these games.
We start with a useful remark:
Remark 3 If xˆ ∈ NEAS, then
P
(
lim
n
xn = xˆ
)
> 0
on the event {x0 ∈ B(xˆ)}.
This is just a consequence of the result in Bena¨ım (1999) mentioned earlier and the
fact that xˆ ∈ NEAS is an attractor. It says that the process can converge to desirable
outcomes. We next turn to the hard part, i.e. excluding the convergence to undesirable
zeros in every game with isolated zeros.
5.1 Non convergence to undesirable zeros
In games with continuum of equilibria, we cannot exclude the possibility of our learning
process getting arbitrarily close to elements of the set of other zeros. More precisely,
there is no a priori reason to believe that the learning process will converge (to a point)
when zeros of the dynamical system are connected components. If it does not, then
the process could come arbitrarily close to a continuum of NE that is connected to a
continuum of OZ, and oscillate between the two. However, when zeros are isolated this
cannot happen and we can discard convergence to other zeros. Further, we can almost
always discard convergence to linearly unstable Nash equilibria.
Theorem 4 Let G be a game with isolated zeros and assume that xˆ ∈ Z. Then:
i) If xˆ ∈ OZ, then P (limn xn = xˆ) = 0.
ii) If xˆ ∈ Int(X), xˆ ∈ NELU , and G(xˆ) is non-bipartite, then P (limn xn = xˆ) = 0
The proof of point a) is a probabilistic proof. We show that in OZ, the players who
are playing 0 although they have a strictly positive gradient will, in expectation, increase
their action level as they approach the boundary. This is of course a contradiction.
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5.2 Concave games
As mentioned in Remark 1, Arrow and Hurwicz (1960) and Rosen (1965) analyzed
similar dynamical systems in concave games. The first investigates a subclass of all
games with payoff functions that are concave in players’ own actions and convex in
other players’ actions. These games include the well-known class of zero-sum games.
The authors then prove global convergence of system (3).
Rosen (1965) deals with concave games, and provides sufficient conditions for the
game to have a unique Nash equilibrium when the strategy space is compact and convex:
if there are some positive weights such that the weighted sum of the payoff functions
is diagonally strictly concave, then the equilibrium of the game is unique. Under that
assumption, the author proves that the weighted gradient system (4) globally converges
to this unique equilibrium.
We are interested in determining whether the DGAP also converges in these games,
but this raises several problems. First, we need to show that our deterministic system
(2) has the same good convergence properties as (3) and (4). But this is not enough,
since our process is stochastic, unlike theirs. Second therefore, we need to show that the
limit set of the stochastic process (1) is included in the set of stationary points of the dy-
namical system (2) for these games. Last, the games considered in Arrow and Hurwicz
(1960) sometimes have continua of equilibria. For instance, in zero-sum games, the set
of equilibria is known to be convex. To avoid this issue, we maintain the concavity con-
dition on the payoff functions but we require that at least one player’s payoff function
is strictly concave in own action. Under this assumption, we show that these games
satisfy Rosen’s (1965) condition - and thus have a unique Nash equilibrium. We next
show that all games satisfying Rosen’s condition have isolated zeros for our dynamical
system. With this in hand, we prove that the DGAP converges to the unique Nash
equilibrium with probability 1.
Suppose that ui is concave in xi for every i. Following Rosen (1965), given r ∈ (R∗+)
N
and x ∈ X , let g(x, r) ∈ RN be given by gi(x, r) = ri
∂ui
∂xi
14. A game is diagonally strictly
concave if
∃r ∈ (R∗+)
N | ∀x0 6= x1 ∈ X we have
〈
x1 − x0 | g(x0, r)
〉
+
〈
x0 − x1 | g(x1, r)
〉
> 0
(8)
Games having this property are denoted by GRos. It is proved (Theorem 2 of Rosen
(1965)) that games in GRos have a unique Nash equilibrium when the state space is
compact. In our context, where the state space is unbounded, they may have none.
14 The dynamical system x˙ = g(x, r) is a weighted gradient system, and is significantly different
from the system (2)
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Games considered by Arrow and Hurwicz (1960) (which we call concave-convex
games, and denote by GArr) are as follow. Let S be a subset of N , the set of play-
ers, and define fS =
∑
i∈S ui −
∑
i∈N\S ui. A game is concave-convex if a) for each
S ⊆ N , the function fS(xS, xN\S) is concave in xS for each xN\S and convex in xN\S
for each xS, and b) for some S0 ⊆ N , fS
0
(xS
0
, xN\S
0
) is strictly concave in xS
0
for each
xN\S
0
. If in addition ui is strictly concave in xi, then we say that the game is strictly
concave-convex.
Remark 4 Stricly concave-convex games are diagonally strictly concave, i.e. GArr ⊂
GRos. Thus all properties of the later apply to the former.
For simplicity, in the remainder of this section we will place ourselves in the setting
of Rosen (1965), i.e. we assume that the strategy space X is a compact set. This
guarantees that the Nash equilibrium is unique. When the set X is unbounded, the
game could have no equilibrium at all and if that happened, the process would go to
infinity. Because this introduces unnecessary complexities in the proof, we restrict our
attention to compact sets.
The fact that the Nash equilibrium is unique is convenient for the study of dynamics
where the Nash equilibria are the only stationary points. However, the system (2) also
has other zeros, since Z = NE ∪ OZ. In the following theorem, we show that there is
a finite number of other zeros, and thus all the stationary points are isolated. We also
state our convergence result.
Theorem 5 Let G ∈ GRos. Then,
(i) Z is a finite set
(ii) There is a unique Nash equilibrium x¯ and
P(lim
n
xn = x) = 1.
The proof of the first point goes as follows: we prove that games in GRos are such
that, after removing a subset of players playing 0, the remaining subgame is also in GRos.
Thus there is at most one Nash equilibrium for any combination of agents playing 0.
The number of such potential combinations is finite, so the result follows.
In order to prove the second point of Theorem 5, we show that the zeros of (2) are
the only candidates for limit points of our process. We cannot do this in general games
with isolated zeros, but in diagonally strictly concave games we can, by decomposing the
state space into several subspaces (respectively, the interior of the space and every face)
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and constructing appropriate Lyapunov functions for each subspace. As a consequence,
we prove that every solution of (2) converges to one of the zeros. Since zeros are the
only candidates, we get the desired conclusion by using point i) of Theorem 4.
Appendix
A Proof of results of Section 2
Proof of Proposition 1. We first prove that the process can be written as in equa-
tion (1). Second we prove that the process is well-defined, i.e. xin > 0 for all i and all
n.
1- We have, for any i ∈ N ,
ei2n+2 − e
i
2n = e
i
2nǫ
i
n∆u
i
n+1
A first order development gives
ǫin∆u
i
n+1 = ǫ
i
n
(
ui
(
ei2n +
1
n + 1
ǫin, e
−i
2n +
1
n+ 1
ǫ−in
)
− ui(e
i
2n, e
−i
2n)
)
=
1
n+ 1
(ǫin)
2∂ui
∂xi
(e2n) +
1
n + 1
ǫin
∑
j 6=i
ǫjn
∂ui
∂xj
(e2n) +O(
1
n2
)
Because (ǫin)
2 = 1 and xn = e2n, we have
xin+1 − x
i
n =
1
n+ 1
xin
∂ui
∂xi
(xn) +
1
n + 1
ǫinx
i
n
∑
j 6=i
ǫjn
∂ui
∂xj
(xn) +O(
1
n2
)
By setting U in+1 = ǫ
i
nx
i
n
∑
j 6=i ǫ
j
n
∂ui
∂xj
(xn), we get equation (1). Finally, note that E (ǫ
j
n) =
0 for all j, and that ǫin and ǫ
j
n are independent, so that
E (Un+1 | Fn) = 0. 
2- Let us now show that the process is well-defined. Notice that Hypothesis 1 implies
that Dui is bounded everywhere. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we will
assume that |ui(x)−ui(x′)| < ‖x−x′‖∞. This is just for simplicity, the proof can easily
be accommodated otherwise. Let n ≥ 0. By assumption, |ui(x) − ui(x′)| ≤ ‖x− x′‖∞
for all i. Thus,
xin+1
xin
≥ (1− ‖e2n+1 − xn‖∞),
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and |ei2n+1 − x
i
n| ≤
1
n+1
for all i. As a consequence,
xin+1
xin
≥ (1−
1
n+ 1
).
Thus, xi1 ≥ 0 and
xin ≥ x
i
1
n−1∏
k=1
(
1−
1
k + 1
)
=
1
n + 1
xi1 ≥ 0.
Note that at the beginning of the process, steps are large. Thus in case xi0 is close to
0, the exploration phase might take players to the negative orthant (e1 ≤ 0). This can
only happen because the first steps are large. In order to avoid that, we can either
assume that xi0 > 1 (i.e. players start far enough from the boundary), or that the
process begins at step n ≥ mini{E(1/x
i
0)}+ 1, where E(a) is the integer part of a (i.e.
the first steps are not too large). In any case, this is totally innocuous for what we do
and guarantees that e1 ≥ 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Pick xˆ ∈ OZ and assume without loss of generality that
xˆ1 = 0 with
∂u1
∂x1
(xˆ) > 0. Then
∂F1
∂x1
(xˆ) =
∂u1
∂x1
(xˆ), and
∂F1
∂xj
(xˆ) = 0 for j 6= 1.
Hence ∂u1
∂x1
(xˆ) ∈ Sp(DF (xˆ)), and the associated eigenvector is v = (1, 0, ..., 0) which
points inwards (i.e. xˆ+ v ∈ X). Thus, necessarily OZ ⊂ ZLU .
Next, ZS ⊂ NE is a consequence of Z = NE ∪OZ, ZS = Z \ZLU and OZ ⊂ ZLU .

B Proof of results of Section 3
B.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Under Assumption 3, for any i, there exists xi > 0 such that
∂ui
∂xi
(xi, 0) > αi > 0, ∀xi ≤ xi.
Since the game has strategic complements,
∂ui
∂xi
(xi, x−i) > αi > 0, ∀xi < xi, ∀x−i ∈ X−i. (9)
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As a consequence, any solution trajectory with initial condition in the set {x ∈ X :
xi ∈]0, xi[} is in the set {x ∈ X : xi > xi} after some finite time t > 0. Let a = mini xi.
Therefore any invariant set is contained either in [a,∞[N or in ∂X . Thus, by the
aforementioned result of Bena¨ım (1999), we can conclude that
P
(
L((xn)n) ⊂ [a,∞[
N
)
+ P (L((xn)n) ⊂ ∂X) = 1.
In what follows we will show that P (L((xn)n) ⊂ ∂X) = 0. The main idea is to
exploit the fact that the strategic complementarity condition implies that, if x ∈ ∂X
and for some coordinate xi = 0 then
∂ui
∂xi
(x) must be strictly positive (there is no Nash
equilibria on ∂X).
Remark 5 Three simple observations are in order.
(i) Condition (9) implies that if ∂ui
∂xi
(x) ≤ 0, then xi ≥ a.
(ii) If x ∈ X \ [a,+∞[N , the set of coordinates for which ∂ui
∂xi
(x) > 0, Ix, is always
nonempty. This is because if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, ∂ui
∂xi
(x) ≤ 0 then x ∈ [a,+∞[N .
(iii) Moreover, also from (9), the coordinate k achieving the minimum value of a vector
x ∈ X \ [a,+∞[N verifies that ∂uk
∂xk
(x) > α, where α = mini αi > 0. Therefore this
particular k belongs to the set Ix.
Let d(x, ∂X) be distance for the infinity norm of x to ∂X , i.e. d(x, ∂X) = mini xi.
Let us take R > a and consider the sets UR:
and UR =
{
x ∈ X ;
∂ui
∂xi
(x) < 0⇒ −xi
∂ui
∂xi
(x) ≤ R
}
.
Observe that ∂X can be written as an increasing union of the form:
∂X =
∞⋃
R=1
(∂X ∩ UR) , (10)
In order to show that P (L((xn)n) ⊂ ∂X) = 0, it is sufficient to prove that, for all
R > a, P (L((xn)n) ⊂ ∂X ∩ UR) = 0. By contradiction, assume that there exists R > a
such that P (L((xn)n) ⊂ ∂X ∩ UR) > 0 and let 0 < ε < a. On the event {L((xn)n) ⊂
∂X ∩ UR}, there exists a (random) n∗ ∈ N such that
P ({L((xn)n) ⊂ ∂X} ∩ {xn ∈ Vε ∩ UR, for all n ≥ n∗}) > 0, (11)
where
Vε = {x ∈ X ; d(x, ∂X) ≤ ε} .
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In what follows, we work on the event E defined by (11) and we assume that n ≥ n∗.
For β > 0, let the function
Φβ(x) = −
1
β
ln
(
N∑
i=1
exp(−βxi)
)
,
which is concave if extended as −∞ to RN . The function Φ verifies the well-known
relation
min
i=1,...,N
xi −
ln(N)
β
≤ Φβ(x) ≤ min
i=1,...,N
xi. (12)
From a straightforward calculation we have that, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
∂Φβ
∂xi
(x) = πi(x), where πi(x) =
exp(−βxi)∑N
j=1 exp(−βx
j)
.
Also, for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}
∂2Φβ
∂xj∂xi
(x) = −βπi(x)(δij − πj(x)),
where δij = 1 if i = j, and 0 otherwise. This implies that ∇Φβ is L-Lipschitz. In fact,
L ≤ 2β for the infinity norm.
Observe that if x ∈ Vε ∩ UR and if
∂ui
∂xi
(x) ≤ 0 for some coordinate i, we have that
πi(x) ≤ exp (−β(a− ε)) ,
using the fact that it exists some k such that xk ≤ ε and that xi ≥ a (c.f. Remark 5).
On the other hand, for k ∈ Ix such that xk = mini xi,
πk(x) =
1
1 +
∑
j 6=k exp (βx
k − βxj)
≥
1
N
.
Recall that the variable xn follows the recursion
xin+1 = x
i
n +
1
n+ 1
(
xin
∂ui
∂xi
(xn) + U
i
n+1 + ξ
i
n+1
)
,
where E (Un+1 | Fn) = 0 and |ξin| ≤ C/n, for a deterministic constant C.
Let us define zn = Φβ(xn). Note first that, from equation (12),
−
ln(N)
β
≤ min
i=1,...,N
xin −
ln(N)
β
≤ zn ≤ min
i=1,...,N
xin ≤ ǫ. (13)
Consequently, L((zn)n) ⊂ [− ln(N)/β, 0] almost surely on E.
26
On the other hand, since the function −Φβ is convex with L-Lipschitz gradient, we
have that
−Φβ(xn+1) ≤ −Φβ(xn) + 〈−∇Φβ(xn) , xn+1 − xn〉+
L
2
‖xn+1 − xn‖
2 .
Equivalently,
zn+1 ≥ zn +
N∑
j=1
πj(xn)(x
j
n+1 − x
j
n)−
L
2
‖xn+1 − xn‖
2 ,
= zn +
1
n+ 1
N∑
j=1
πj(xn)
(
xjn
∂ui
∂xj
(xn) + U
j
n+1 + ξ
j
n+1
)
−
L
2
‖xn+1 − xn‖
2 ,
≥ zn +
1
n+ 1
N∑
j=1
πj(xn)x
j
n
∂ui
∂xj
(xn) +
1
n+ 1
N∑
j=1
πj(xn)U
j
n+1 −
c
(n+ 1)2
,
for some deterministic constant c ≥ 0. Therefore, taking conditional expectation and
omitting the quadratic term,
E (zn+1 | Fn) ≥ zn +
1
n+ 1
N∑
j=1
πj(xn)x
j
n
∂ui
∂xj
(xn).
Recall that Ixn is the set of indices such that
∂ui
∂xi
(xn) > 0 and that kn the coordinate
giving the minimum of xn is in Ixn and verifies moreover that
∂ui
∂xi
(xn) > α . Let Jxn
the set of indices such that ∂ui
∂xi
(xn) ≤ 0.
For all n ≥ n∗ we have
E (zn+1 | Fn) ≥ zn +
1
n + 1
∑
j∈Ixn
πj(xn)x
j
n
∂ui
∂xj
(xn) +
1
n+ 1
∑
j∈Jxn
πj(xn)x
j
n
∂ui
∂xj
(xn),
≥ zn +
zn
n + 1
α
N
+
1
n + 1
∑
j∈Jxn
πj(xn)x
j
n
∂ui
∂xj
(xn),
using that xknn ≥ zn and that πkn(xn) ≥ 1/N . On the other hand, using the definition
of UR, we obtain∑
j∈Jxn
πj(xn)x
j
n
∂ui
∂xj
(xn) ≥ −|Jxn|R exp (−β(a− ε)) ≥ −NR exp (−β(a− ε)) .
Thus
E (zn+1 | Fn) ≥ zn +
1
n+ 1
( α
N
zn −NR exp (−β(a− ε))
)
.
Let us consider the change of variables
θn =
(
zn +
ln(N)
β
)
≥ min
i
xin ≥ 0.
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Then,
E(θn+1) ≥ E(θn) +
α
N
1
n+ 1

E(θn)−
{
N2
α
R exp (−β(a− ε)) +
ln(N)
β
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
c(β)

 .
Let us note that E(θn∗) > 0 since mini x
i
n∗ ≥ 1/(n∗+1) almost surely. Now, we can
fix β > 0 sufficiently large such that 0 < c(β) < E(θn∗). So that
E(θn+1) ≥ E(θn) +
α
N
1
n + 1
(E(θn)− c(β)) .
Let us call ρn = E(θn) − c(β). Then, we want to analyse the recursion ρn+1 ≥ ρn(1 +
α
N
1
n+1
), with ρn∗ > 0. Hence, for n ≥ n∗,
ρn+1 ≥ ρn∗
n∏
i=n∗
(
1 +
α
N
1
i+ 1
)
,
where the right-hand-side goes to infinity. Finally, we can conclude that E(zn) goes to
infinity, which is a contradiction with the fact that zn ∈ [− ln(N)/β, ǫ] almost surely
on the event E. 
B.2 Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 involves several arguments. For point (i), we use a result from
Pemantle (1990), while for point (ii) we adapt a result from (2012). For both points
we use Proposition 3, i.e the fact that the limit set of the process cannot include points
on the boundary of the state space.
For the first point of Theorem 1, let us recall some results on non convergence. Let x˜
be a linearly unstable equilibrium. Assume without loss of generality that the unstable
space at x˜ is one-dimensional, that is DF (x˜) has only one eigenvalue µ with positive
real part, and we call v the associated normalized eigenvector. We use a result from
Pemantle (1990), more precisely in the settings of Brandiere and Duflo (1996), which
states that a sufficient condition for non convergence to x˜ is that the noise is exciting
in the unstable direction, i.e.:
lim inf
n→+∞
E
(
〈Un+1, v〉
2 | Fn
)
> 0 (14)
on the event {limn xn = x˜}.
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Consider any xn and any vector v. Then
〈Un+1, v〉
2 =
(∑
i<j
ǫinǫ
j
n
(
vix
i
n
∂ui
∂xj
(xn) + vjx
j
n
∂uj
∂xi
(xn)
))2
Using E (ǫinǫ
j
n) = 0 if i 6= j and (ǫ
i
n)
2 = 1, we get
E
(
〈Un+1, v〉
2 | xn
)
=
∑
i<j
(
vix
i
n
∂ui
∂xj
(xn) + vjx
j
n
∂uj
∂xi
(xn)
)2
(15)
Proof of Theorem 1 (i). Let x˜ be a linearly unstable equilibrium. We want to show
that ∑
i<j
(
vix˜
i ∂ui
∂xj
(x˜) + vjx˜
j ∂uj
∂xi
(x˜)
)2
6= 0.
where v is the normalized eigenvector associated associated to the unstable direction of
x˜.
Note that x˜ /∈ ∂X by Proposition 3, and that when x˜ ∈ Int(X) and the interaction
graph is non-bipartite, then the result is a direct implication of Theorem 4 in Section 5.
Thus, here we assume that the interaction graph is connected and bipartite, and that
x˜ ∈ Int(X). This implies that there exists a partition (A,B) of N such that if a ∈ A
and ∂ua
∂xb
(x˜) ∂ub
∂xa
(x˜) > 0 then b ∈ B.
Using the computations just developed, we need to show that
∑
a<b
(
vax
a∂ua
∂xb
(x˜) + vbx
b ∂ub
∂xa
(x˜)
)2
6= 0. (16)
Assume the contrary. Then we must have vax
a ∂ua
∂xb
(x˜) + vbx
b ∂ub
∂xa
(x˜) = 0 for all a ∈ A
and all b ∈ B. Because xi > 0 for all i, and by Hypothesis 2 (symmetric externalities),
it must be that sgn(va) = − sgn(vb) for any a ∈ A and any b ∈ B. Since the interaction
graph is connected, we may assume without loss of generality that va > 0 ∀ a ∈ A and
vb < 0 ∀ b ∈ B.
Because µ is strictly positive and v is the corresponding normalized eigenvector, we
should have 〈vDF (x˜), v〉 = µ
∑
i v
2
i > 0, since v 6= 0. However, we will show that this
can only be true if equation (16) holds. By a simple rearrangement of the indexes, the
Jacobian matrix at x˜ can be written as follows:
DF (x˜) =
(
DA M
N DB
)
,
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where DA is diagonal and the diagonal terms are equal to x
a∂2ua/∂(x
a)2(x˜) ≤ 0 with
a ∈ A; and similarly for DB. M and N are non-negative matrices, as x
i∂2ui/∂x
i∂xj ≥
0 ∀i 6= j.
Thus,
〈vDF (x˜), v〉 =
∑
i
v2i x
i∂2ui/∂(x
i)2 +
∑
a∈A,b∈B
vavb
(
xa
∂2ua
∂xa∂xb
+ xb
∂2ub
∂xa∂xb
)
≤ 0,
a contradiction. To see why this inequality holds, remember that the terms in the
first sum are all negative by Hypothesis 1 and the fact that x˜ is a Nash equilibrium.
The terms in the second sum are also all negative since va.vb < 0 and by strategic
complements. 
For the proof of point (ii), we use the following theorem of (2012), conveniently
adapted to our setting.
Theorem B.1 (Bena¨ım and Faure, 2012) Let (xn)n ∈ X be a random process that
can be written as
xn+1 = xn +
1
n + 1
(F (xn) + Un+1 + ξn+1)
where
(i) F : X → RN is a smooth map, that is cooperative and irreducible in Int(X),
(ii) Un+1 is a bounded martingale difference and is uniformly exciting, i.e. the matrix
E
(
Un+1U
T
n+1 | xn = x
)
is positive definite for any x ∈ Int(X),
(iii) ξn = O(1/n), and
(iv) there exists a > 0 such that L(xn)n ⊂ [a,+∞[ almost surely.
Then
P
(
∃ x∗ ∈ ZS : lim
n
xn = x
∗
)
= 1
on the event {lim supn ‖xn‖ < +∞}.
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Proof of Theorem 1 (ii). We want to apply Theorem B.1.
When the game is of strategic complements, our dynamics x˙ = F (x) is cooperative
because all non-diagonal entries of DF (x) are nonnegative. In addition, Hypothesis 2
guarantees that the interaction graph is strongly connected. Thus the matrix DF (x)
is irreducible for any x in the interior of X . These two facts provide point (i). Points
(iii) and (iv) follow from Propositions 1 and 3, respectively. To prove point (ii), we
prove that if a network is non-bipartite and the game exhibits symmetric interactions,
then the noise is uniformly exciting.
Since for any v ∈ RN we have that vTUn+1UTn+1v = 〈Un+1, v〉
2 ≥ 0, (ii) amounts to
showing that, for any x ∈ Int(X), we have
E
(
〈Un+1, v〉
2 | xn = x
)
= 0
if and only if v = 0. By equation (15), we see that the condition is verified in v if and
only if
∀i < j, vix˜
i ∂ui
∂xj
(x˜) + vj x˜
j ∂uj
∂xi
(x˜) = 0.
We now prove that under the assumption of symmetric interactions and non-bipartiteness
of the graph, this quantity is positive.
Since the interaction graph is non bipartite in x˜, there is at least one odd cycle. Let
us assume, for simplicity but without loss of generality, that this cycle is of length 3:
there exist i, j, k such that
∂ui
∂xj
(x˜)
∂uj
∂xi
(x˜) > 0,
∂uj
∂xk
(x˜)
∂uk
∂xj
(x˜) > 0,
∂ui
∂xk
(x˜)
∂uk
∂xi
(x˜) > 0.
We thus have sgn(vi) = − sgn(vj) = sgn(vk) = − sgn(vi) which implies, since x˜ is
interior, that vi = vj = vk = 0. As a consequence, for every agent l linked to i, j or k,
we must have vl = 0. Recursively, since the interaction graph is connected, we must
have v = 0, which concludes the proof. 
C Proof of results of Section 4.
C.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Before proving Theorem 2, let us define the following dynamical concept:
Definition C.1 Let P : X → R be continuously differentiable. We say that P is a
strict15 Lyapunov function for x˙ = F (x) if
15Generally, P is a Lyapunov function for x˙ = F (x) with respect to Λ if t 7→ P (ϕ(x, t)) is constant
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• for x ∈ Z the map t 7→ P (ϕ(x, t)) is constant;
• for x /∈ Z the map t 7→ P (ϕ(x, t)) is strictly increasing.
Lemma C.1 Assume that G is an LOPG with continuously differentiable potential P .
Then
(i) P is a strict Lyapunov function for x˙ = −x+ BR(x).
(ii) P is a strict Lyapunov function for x˙ = F (x) (where Fi(x) = xi
∂ui
∂xi
(x)).
Proof. By assumption,
∀x, ∀i,
∂ui
∂xi
(x) > 0⇒
∂P
∂xi
(x) > 0 and
∂ui
∂xi
(x) < 0⇒
∂P
∂xi
(x) < 0.
(i) We have
〈DP (x),−x+ BR(x)〉 =
∑
i
∂P
∂xi
(x)(−xi + BRi(x)).
We need to check that, if x /∈ NE, then this quantity is positive. Let i be such that
xi 6= BRi(x), say xi < BRi(x−i). Then by strict concavity of ui we have
∂ui
∂xi
(x) > 0.
Thus ∂P
∂xi
(x) > 0 and 〈DP (x),−x+ BR(x)〉 > 0.
(ii) We have
〈DP (x), F (x)〉 =
∑
i
xi
∂ui
∂xi
(x)
∂P
∂xi
(x).
We need to check that, if x /∈ Z, then this quantity is positive. Let i be such that
Fi(x) 6= 0. Then xi > 0 and
∂ui
∂xi
(x) 6= 0, which implies that
xi
∂ui
∂xi
(x)
∂P
∂xi
(x) > 0.
and the proof is complete. 
Proof of Theorem 2 (i). For this part, we use the general result given by Proposi-
tion 6.4 in Bena¨ım (1999), which asserts that if P is a strict Lyapunov function with
respect to Z and P (Z) has empty interior, then L(xn) ⊂ Z almost surely. Therefore,
the following lemma finishes the proof. 
on Λ and strictly increasing for x /∈ Λ; when the component Λ coincides with the set of stationary
points of the flow, then we say that P is strict.
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Lemma C.2 Assume G is an LOPG. Then, if P is sufficiently regular, P (Z) has an
empty interior.
Proof. We decompose the set of zeroes of F as a finite union of sets on which we can
use Sard’s Theorem.
Let A be any subset of agents and ZA be the set{
x ∈ Z : xi = 0 ∀i /∈ A,
∂ui
∂xi
= 0 ∀i ∈ A
}
.
It is not hard to see that ZA is closed. Moreover Z = ∪A∈P({1,...,N})ZA.
We now prove that P is constant on ZA. Let P
A : [0, 1]A → R be defined as
PA(z) := P (z, 0).
For x ∈ ZA, denote by xA = (xi)i∈A. We then have PA(xA) = P (x). Moreover, for
i ∈ A,
∂PA
∂xi
= 0
by definition of ZA and the additional assumption we made on P . Hence
{xA : x ∈ ZA} ⊂ {z ∈ [0, 1]
A : ∇zP
A = 0}.
Now P is sufficiently differenciable, so is PA, and by Sard’s Theorem, PA({xA : x ∈
ZA}) has empty interior in RA. As an immediate consequence, PA is constant on
{xA : x ∈ ZA} , which directly implies that P (ZA) has empty interior. Since Z is a
finite union of such sets, P (Z) has empty interior. 
Proof of Theorem 2 (ii). This proof relies on Theorem 4 in Section 5, and on the
following: by Lemma C.1 and Corollary 6.6 in Bena¨ım (1999), we have
P
(
∃xˆ ∈ Z such that lim
n
xn = xˆ
)
= 1.
Because convergence to the zeroes is guaranteed, Theorem 4 gives us the result. Point
a) of Theorem 4 gives us the first point of Theorem 2 (ii), and the second point of
Theorem 2 (ii) is a consequence of point b) of Theorem 4. 
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C.2 Proof of Theorem 3
First we prove that (i) implies (ii). Since G is an LOPG, P (Z) has empty interior
(see Lemma C.2 above). Moreover, we have Λ ⊂ Z. Thus P is constant on Λ. Let
v := P (Λ). If Λ is not a local maximum of P then there exists a sequence xn such
that d(xn,Λ) →n 0 and P (xn) > v. Since Λ is isolated we have xn ∈ X \ Z and
P (ϕ(xn, t)) > P (xn) > v for any t > 0 hence d(ϕ(xn, t),Λ) 9 0 and Λ is not an
attractor.
Let us now prove that (ii) implies (iii). First we show that Λ is contained in NE.
Suppose that there exists xˆ ∈ Λ \NE. Without loss of generality, we suppose that
xˆ1 = 0,
∂u1
∂x1
(xˆ) > 0.
Since ∂u1
∂x1
(xˆ) > 0, we also have ∂P
∂x1
(xˆ) > 0, by definition of an LOPG. As a consequence,
xˆ is not a local maximum of P .
We now prove that Λ is an attractor for the Best-Response dynamics. P is a strict
Lyapunov function for the best-response dynamics16 and Λ ⊂ NE. The statement we
want to prove is then a consequence of Proposition 3.25 in Bena¨ım et al. (2005). We
adapt the proof in our context for convenience. First of all observe that Λ is actually a
strict local maximum of P : there exists an open (isolating) neighborhood U of Λ such
that P (x) < v = P (Λ), ∀x ∈ U \ Λ. This is a simple consequence of the fact that P
is strictly increasing along any solution curve with initial conditions in U \ Λ. Now let
Vr := {x ∈ U : P (x) > v − r}. Clearly ∩rVr = Λ. Also ϕ(Vr, t) ⊂ Vr, for t > 0, r small
enough17. This implies that Λ = ∩r>0Vr contains an attractor A. The potential being
constant on Λ, A cannot be strictly contained in Λ and therefore Λ is an attractor.
Now clearly (iii) implies (i): Λ = ωBR(U) for some open neighborhood U of Λ.
Since U ∩ Z ⊂ NE, ωF (U) = ωBR(U) and the proof is complete. 
D Proof of results of Section 5
D.1 Proof of Theorem 4.
Proof of point i). Pick an xˆ ∈ OZ and let us fix i ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that xˆi = 0
and ∂u
i
∂xi
(xˆ) > 0. Observe first that we can work on the event
{
supn→+∞ ‖xn‖ < +∞
}
since, otherwise, there is nothing to prove. We proceed following a similar argument as
in Posch (1997).
16Keep in mind that this means that it is a lyapunov function with respect to NE.
17We need to make sure that r is small enough so that Vr = P
−1([v − r, v]) ⊂ U
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Let us assume by contradiction that P (limn xn = xˆ) > 0. By continuity and from
the fact that xˆ is an isolated point in OZ, there exists a neighborhood V of xˆ such that
∂ui
∂xi
≥ η > 0 for all x ∈ V and we can choose k∗ ∈ N such that
P
(
{lim
n
xn = xˆ} ∩ {xn ∈ V, for all n ≥ k∗}
)
> 0.
Let U˜ in+1 = ǫ
i
n
∑
j ǫ
j
n
∂ui
∂xj
(xn), so that
xin+1 = x
i
n
(
1 +
1
n+ 1
(
∂ui
∂xi
(xn) + U˜
i
n+1 +
ξin+1
xin
))
.
Using a Taylor expansion and the fact that ξin = O(
1
n
) and xin ≥ 1/(n + 1) for n
sufficiently large, we obtain that
1
xin+1
=
1
xin
(
1−
1
n+ 1
(
∂ui
∂xi
(xn) + U˜
i
n+1
)
+ o
(
1
n
))
.
Using that, for n ≥ k∗,
∂ui
∂xi
(xn) ≥ η and E(U˜ in+1 | Fn) = 0, we obtain
E
(
1
xin+1
−
1
xin
| Fn
)
≤ −
1
xin
·
1
n+ 1
·
η
2
≤ 0.
Therefore, the random sequence (1/xin)n is a positive supermartingale. It then converges
almost surely to some random variable Y . However, on the event {limn xn = xˆ}, we
have that xin tends to zero almost surely. These two convergence properties are in
contradiction and the conclusion follows. 
Proof of point ii). As in the proof of Theorem 1, we need to show that the condition
(14) is verified in the unstable direction. However, we have proved in Theorem 1 part
(ii) that the quantity (15) is always strictly positive, unless v = 0. 
D.2 Proof of results in Section 5.2
Proof of Remark 4: Following Rosen (1965), we define G(x, r) as the Jacobian matrix
of g(x, r), with ri ≥ 0. A sufficient condition for a game to belong to GRos is that
G(x, r)+G′(x, r) is negative definite, where G′ is the transpose of G. For simplicity, we
set r = 1, so that gi(x, 1) =
∂ui
∂xi
and Gij(x, 1) =
∂2ui
∂xi∂xj
, and show that games in GArr
are such that G(x, 1) + G′(x, 1) is negative definite. Define the matrices A,Bk and C
as follows:
Aii =
∂2ui
∂x2i
and Aij = 0 if i 6= j
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Bkij = 0 if i = k or j = k and B
k
ij =
∂2uk
∂xi∂xj
if i 6= k and j 6= k
Cij =
∑
k
∂2uk
∂xi∂xj
Then G(x, 1) + G′(x, 1) = A(x) −
∑
k B
k(x) + C(x). By concavity of ui in xi, A is
negative semi-definite and is negative definite as soon as one ui is strictly concave in xi.
Every Bk is positive semi-definite by convexity of ui in x−i. Finally, strictly concave-
convex games are such that
∑
k uk(x) is concave in x, by taking S = N in the definition
of strictly concave-convex games. Thus C is negative semi-definite. This proves that
G(x, 1) +G′(x, 1) is negative definite. 
Proof of Theorem 5: Suppose first that there is a unique Nash equilibrium. Then
note that under (8) we have, for any x 6= x,
〈x− x, g(x, r)〉 > 0,
because
〈x− x | g(x, r)〉 =
∑
i:xi=0
rixi
∂ui
∂xi
(x) ≤ 0.
Given an element x ∈ X , let I(x) :=
{
i ∈ N : xi = 0 and
∂ui
∂xi
(x) > 0
}
. Given J ⊂ N ,
we call GJ the N−|J |-player game where the set of players is N \J and, for any strategy
profile z ∈ [0,+∞[N−|J |, the payoff function of player i ∈ N \ J is uJi (z) := ui(z, 0
|J |).
Lemma D.1 Let J ⊂ N . There exists a unique profile x˜J with the following properties:
(i) J ⊂ I(x˜J),
(ii) z˜ := (x˜Ji )i/∈J is a Nash equilibrium of G
J .
and x˜J ∈ Z(F ). Moreover, if J ⊂ I(x) then x˜J = x. If not then x˜J belongs to OZ.
Proof. Fix J ⊂ N . The associated game GJ is also strictly diagonally concave. Thus
it admits a unique Nash equilibrium z˜ ∈ [0,+∞[N−|J |. Note that J ⊂ I(z˜) but is not
necessarily equal. Now let x˜J := (z˜, 0J). Clearly x˜J is the only element of X satisfying
both (i) and (ii). Let i /∈ J . We have x˜Ji = z˜i = BR
J
i (z˜−i) = BRi(z˜−i, 0
J) = BRi(x˜
J
−i).
This proves that x˜J belongs to Z(F ).
Now suppose that J ⊂ I(x). Then x satisfies (i). Moreover for all i /∈ J ,
xi = BRi(x−i) = argmaxxi ui(xi, x−i) = argmaxzi u
J(zi, z−i),
by definition of uJ and the fact that xj = 0 for any j ∈ J . Thus (xi)i/∈J is a Nash
equilibrium of GJ and x˜J = x. Finally if J is not contained in I(xˆ) then x˜J 6= x because
x does not satisfy (i). 
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As a consequence, {x˜J , J ⊂ I} can be written as {x, x˜1, ..., x˜K} where all elements are
distinct, and there is a natural partition of X :
X =
(
∪Kk=1X˜
k
)
∪X, where X˜k := {x ∈ X : xˆI(x) = xˆk} and X :=
{
x ∈ X : xˆI(x) = x
}
.
Note that X = {x ∈ X : I(x) ⊂ I(x)} and the sets X, X˜k, k = 1, ..., K are convex.
More accurately every X, X˜k is a union of faces of X : there exist J and a family
(Jk)k=1,...,K of subsets of N such that:
X = ∪J∈J {x ∈ X : I(x) = J}X˜
k = ∪J∈J k{x ∈ X : I(x) = J}.
Now we are ready to prove the theorem, i.e. when a game is diagonally strictly
concave with unique Nash equilibrium x, necessarily
P(lim
n
xn = x) = 1
First let x ∈ X , which amounts to having I(x) ⊂ I(x) and define, for x ∈ X ,
Φ(x) =
∑
i∈I(x)
rixi +
∑
i/∈I(x)
ri(xi − xi log(xi)).
Then Φ is concave on X and achieves its minimum in x. Let φ(t) = Φ(x(t)), where
x(t) is a solution of x˙ = F (x), with x(0) ∈ X . We have
d
dt
φ(t) =
∑
i∈N
ri(xi(t)− xi)
∂ui
∂xi
(x(t)) ≤ 0,
with equality if and only if x = x and x is a global attractor the flow Φ|X .
Now suppose that x ∈ X˜k for a given k ∈ {1, ..., K}. Note that I(x) ⊂ I(x˜k). We can
then define Φk : X˜k → R as the following:
Φk(x) =
∑
i∈I(x˜k)
rixi +
∑
i/∈I(x˜k)
ri(xi − x˜
k
i log(xi)).
Then Φk is again concave, with unique maximum in x = x˜k on X˜k. Let φ(t) = Φ(x(t)),
where x(t) is a solution of x˙ = F (x), with x(0) ∈ X˜k. We have
d
dt
φ(t) =
∑
i∈N
ri(xi(t)− xi)
∂ui
∂xi
(x(t)) ≤ 0,
with equality if and only if x = x˜k. Thus x˜k is a global attractor the flow Φ|X˜k .
As a consequence every solution curve converges to a zero of F , i.e either x or one
of the x˜k.18 More precisely, X and X˜k are invariant and {x} (resp. x˜k) is a global
18This is not enough to guarantee that our random process converges with probability one to one of
the zeroes of the dynamics.
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attractor for the flow φ|X (resp. φ|X˜k); in particular, for any x0 ∈ X (resp. x0 ∈ X˜
k)
then limt→+∞ φt(x0) = x (resp. limt→+∞ φt(x0) = x˜
k).
A set L is internally chain transitive (ICT) for the flow φt if it is compact, invariant
and the restriction of the flow φ|L admits no proper attractor. Of course Lk := {x˜k},
as well as L := {x} are ICT.
Theorem D.1 (Benaim, 1999) The limit set of (xn)n is almost surely internally
chain transitive. Moreover let L be an internally chain transitive set for a flow (φt)t
and A be an attractor with basin of attraction B(A). If L ∩ B(A) 6= ∅ then L ⊂ A.
We now prove that the sets Lk and L are the only internally chain transitive sets.
This will conclude the proof. Note that X is an open set in X . To do so we first claim
that it is always possible to relabel the family (x˜k)k=1,...,K such that X˜
k is an open set
of ∪kl=1X
l for k = 2, ..., K.
Let L be internally chain transitive. By previous result, if L intersects X then L ⊂ {x}
because X is the basin of attraction of x. Suppose that it is not the case. then
L ⊂ ∪Kk=1X
k. Since XK is open in ∪Kk=1X
k, x˜K is an attractor of the flow restricted
to ∪Kk=1X
k, with basin of attraction X˜k. Hence if L ∩ X˜k 6= ∅ then L = {x˜k}. By a
recursive argument, either L = {x} or L = {x˜k} for some k. 
E Examples
In this section, we illustrate through two examples the importance of two conditions we
have used in this paper. The first example illustrate why bipartite interaction graphs
might cause some trouble, while the second shows why the assumption of symmetric
externalities matters.
In every proof of non convergence, the key argument we used relied on the noise
condition (14).
Example E.1 Consider the following 4-player example with strategic substitutes.
u1(x) = −cx1 + b(x1 + x2 + x4), u2(x) = −cx2 + b(x2 + x1 + x3),
u3(x) = −cx3 + b(x3 + x2 + x4), u4(x) = −cx4 + b(x4 + x1 + x3),
with b strictly concave and such that b′(1) = c. This is a game of strategic substitutes,
with an interaction graph represented by the square in Figure 1.
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1 2
34
Figure 1: Different isolated Nash equilibria
One can check that the profile xˆ = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 1/3) is a Nash equilibrium. Choos-
ing b such that b′′(1) = −3 for simplicity, the Jacobian matrix associated to xˆ is
DF (xˆ) =


−1 −1 0 −1
−1 −1 −1 0
0 −1 −1 −1
−1 0 −1 −1

 ,
which eigenvalues are −3,−1,−1, 1. Thus this Nash equilibrium is linearly unsta-
ble. However, the eigenspace associated to the positive eigenvalue is generated by
v = (1,−1, 1,−1) so that, on the event {limn xn = xˆ}, we have
lim
n→+∞
E
(
〈Un+1, v〉
2 | Fn
)
=
(
∂u1
∂x2
(xˆ)−
∂u2
∂x1
(xˆ)
)2
+
(
−
∂u2
∂x3
(xˆ) +
∂u3
∂x2
(xˆ)
)2
+
(
∂u3
∂x4
(xˆ)−
∂u4
∂x3
(xˆ)
)2
= 0
and the noise condition (14) does not hold.
Example E.2 Consider the following 2-player game with strategic complements.
u1(x1, x2) = −
x21
2
+ 2x1 − x1(2− x2)
2; u2(x1, x2) = −
x22
2
− x21(2− x2).
This game has anti-symmetric externalities, since ∂u2
∂x1
(x) = −∂u1
∂x2
(x). Now, the profile
(1, 1) is a Nash equilibrium, and
∂2ui
∂xi∂xj
(xˆ) = 2, i = 1, 2.
As a consequence the Jacobian matrix associated to the dynamics F is simply
DF (xˆ) =
(
−1 2
2 −1
)
,
39
which eigenvalues are −3 and 1. Thus this Nash equilibrium is linearly unstable. The
eigenspace associated to the positive eigenvalue is generated by v = (1, 1). Thus, on the
event {limn xn = xˆ}, we have
lim
n→+∞
E
(
〈Un+1, v〉
2 | Fn
)
=
(
∂u1
∂x2
(xˆ) +
∂u2
∂x1
(xˆ)
)2
= 0
and the noise condition does not hold.
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